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Evaluating ombudsman:  A case study in developing a 








The ombudsman institution has been described as an “enigma”. Indeed, evaluations of the 
performance and effectiveness of the institution have been rare. This paper describes the 
creation of a methodology enabling the first quantitative longitudinal analysis of the 
Australian Commonwealth Ombudsman. The methodology covers a 28 year period of the 
Office from its inception in 1977 through to 2005.  In essence the methodology is comprised 
of the creation of two data sets (one for systemic investigations and one for individual 
complaints) to allow comparative analysis which may assess both roles of the ombudsman 
and test for statistical interaction between the dual roles. While there is a brief example in the 
conclusion of the paper on the results of the data analysis the main aim of this paper is to 
detail the steps taken to develop the methodology to enable replication and adaptation across 







Since ombudsman appeared outside Scandanavia in the 1960s the institution has been 
subject to much debate within public administration literature with overwhelmingly 
support being attributed to the success of the institution.
1
 A central feature of this 
evaluation literature however, is the absence of any accepted or universal empirical 
methodology used to support this conclusion.
2
  Indeed the variety of empirical 
approaches used in the literature include: on location observation as to how the 
ombudsman works;
3
  surveys of the general population;
4
 analysis of specific case 
studies;
5
 seeking of written submissions from interested persons;
6
 surveys of 
complainants to the office;
7




Without exception this existing empirical work focuses upon assessing the individual 
complaint taking role of ombudsman.  This is despite traditional acknowledgment that the 
public law ombudsman institution has a proactive system fixing role which supplements 
its individual complaint taking role, for example in Alberta, Canada in 1970, Chief 
Justice Milvain states in Re Ombudsman Act (1970) (72 WWR 176, 190 and 192): 
 
the basic purpose of an Ombudsman is provision 
of a “watchdog” designed to look into the entire 
workings of administrative cases. ... [he] can 
bring the lamp of scrutiny to otherwise dark 
places even over the resistance of those who 
would draw the blinds. If [his] scrutiny and 
reservations are well founded, corrective 
 3 
measure can be taken in due democratic process, 
if not no harm can be done in looking at that 
which is good. 
 
Implicit in the above statement is the dual function of most ombudsman.  The first and 
most dominant role being the “correction” of administrative deficiencies arising through 
individual grievances (such as rudeness by government officials or mistake or slowness).  
The second more subservient role being a system fixing role where the recommendations 
and investigations of an ombudsman may improve procedures, policy or legislation 
impacting upon many more people than a single individual complainant.
9
   
 
Apart from lacking consistency and failing to evaluate this duality of ombudsman roles 
the existing evaluative literature is also descriptive and localized.  Indeed, the seminal 
attempt to create a universal method of ombudsman evaluation was undertaken 30 years 
ago by Danet in 1978.
10
    Ayeni in 1993, 15 years after the 1978 publication of Danet’s 
article “Toward a Method to Evaluate the Ombudsman Role” states that the article by 
Danet remains “the most comprehensive and authoritative attempt to articulate an 
evaluatory framework for the ombudsman plan”.11 This sentiment is echoed in 2000, 
some 22 years later by Aufrecht and Hertogh
12
 who explain that it was in 1980 at the 
second international ombudsman conference where one panel focused on the “efficiency 
and effectiveness of the ombudsman” where Brenda Danet argued that after an initial 
period of prescription (where everyone told themselves how good it would be to have an 
ombudsman) followed by a time of description (what is the function and jurisdiction of 
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the individual office) that it was time to make a “serious commitment to evaluation” 
(does the office deliver what was promised?).  Aufrecht and Hertogh point out that today 
our attention remains on prescription and description. 
This is also the case in Australia
13
 where despite calls throughout the history of the Office 
for independent critical examination of its operation
14
 between 1977-2005 there is only 
one external evaluation of its effectiveness.
15
 This absence of Australian empirical study 
is particularly noteworthy given firstly, that at the federal level the Commonwealth 
Ombudsman (the “Office”) has now been in existence for 30 years and secondly that the 
Office has been one of the busiest ombudsman offices in the world
16
 and that finally, the 
comparative numerical impact the Office has upon complaint resolution and government 
service delivery in Australia:  
 
over a twenty-five year period, the number of 
Federal Court applications for administrative 
law matters is less than 10, 000, as compared, in 
the same period, with nearly 500,000 complaints 
to the Commonwealth Ombudsman alone, and 
that the combined administrative review 
caseload of the major Commonwealth tribunals 




Of course the Office itself has kept Annual Reports recording comprehensive statistics 
with respect to individual complaint numbers and sporadic and has made attempts to 
measure its own effectiveness in terms of its dual systemic role throughout the 28 year 
period under study.   
 
The aim of this study is to help to redress this lack of international systematic evaluation 
through producing a methodology to evaluate the dual roles of the ombudsman institution 
and to afford comparative data analysis by focusing upon the Australian Commonwealth 
Ombudsman.  Given the shared genesis of the ombudsman concept from a Swedish 
grundnorm the methodology developed in this study has both national and international 
application.   
 
It is broadly agreed that the modern office of the ombudsman originated in Sweden in 
1809 with the creation of the Parliamentary Ombudsmen (Riksdagens ombudsmän).
18
  
This original Swedish prototype has been transplanted and modified to suit the needs of 
the political institutions of each individual country. Finland followed Sweden in 1919, 
and by the middle of the twentieth century other countries begin to rapidly copy and 
adapt government or classical ombudsman: Denmark (1954), Norway (1962) and 
contemporaneously in the English speaking world first in 1962 in New Zealand
19
 and 
then in the United Kingdom (1967).  The result today is that the ombudsman now exists 
on every continent. By the late 1960s the concept spread to most Canadian provinces and 
American states.  It also began to spread to Africa, Tanzania (1968) and Israel (1971).  In 
the 1970s the ombudsman concept was introduced in most Australian jurisdictions (1977 
 6 
at the federal level, 1972-1979 at the state level), Puerto Rico (1977),  France (1973), 
Portugal (1975), Austria (1977).  In the 1980s the ombudsman idea had been accepted in 
almost every Western European country and had begun to spread to Asia with the 
institution being introduced in Hong Kong (1989), Macao (1992), Jordan (1994), 
Republic of  Korea (1994) and Thailand (1999) with the Asian Ombudsman Association 
being organized in 1996. Currently, an estimated 120 countries have national ombudsman 
offices.
20
  It is not only the classical ombudsman which has proliferated.  Supra-national 
structures such as the European Union and organizations such as universities and 
privatized industries (eg: telecommunications and electricity) have adopted the 
ombudsman model does so due to its own particular needs.  Todays ombudsman is an 
international phenomenon which has “conquered the world”.21  Australia is no exception 
to this trend.  In addition to a federal Commonwealth Ombudsman Australia has 8 public 
law ombudsman – 6 state ombudsman and two territory ombudsman22 and a plethora of 




This study is among the first empirical attempts to evaluate a mature ombudsman 
institution using quantitative methodology.  Its measures of impact and performance will 
be particularly relevant to the ombudsman institution and to complaint-handling bodies 
more generally.  Given the above factors: the generic origins of the institution, its 
international prevalence together with its role as a democratic imperative it is surprising 
that there is a lack of empirical measures of the impact and effectiveness of ombudsman.  





Part 1   Introduction 
 
This study develops a quantitative approach to allow for the testing of the following 
two hypotheses about the operation of the Office: 
 
(1) that the Commonwealth Ombudsman is increasingly using its systemic 




(2) that the systemics function is linked to number and types of individual 
complaints. 
 
The comparative longitudinal quantitative approach used by this study has both strengths 
and limitations. A strength is the ability of numerical data to measure past outcomes and 
predict future variances.  A quantitative approach is therefore useful to explore 
relationships between computed variables over time and cross-sectionally.  As 
quantitative research is the application of a numerical approach another advantage is that 
it can relate diverse factors.  The use of a quantitative paradigm does however mean that 
this study primarily measures quantity of systemic impact rather than quality.  Of course, 
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wherever possible, the study will utilize qualitative research methods to examine 
systemic investigations holistically and to make observations as to quality of impact.
24
    
 
This Part begins by detailing the parameters and outline of the research design.  This 
involves outlining the research question, explaining the origin of the data and identifying 
the research materials used.  The main focus of this Part is to scope the study, to identify 
exactly what is being measured.  This involves the application of the methodological 
approaches such as those of Danet mentioned previously
25
 to identify and isolate the 
measurable systemic functions of the Office.  This discussion identifies nine functions of 
the Office – all of which may impact upon its systemic role. Of these nine functions this 
study measures three: formal reports and own motions and submissions.  It is made 
explicit in Part II that this study evaluates only a small part of the Office”s systemic 
functions.    
 
Part III then explains the research techniques used to create both data sets of systemic 
investigations and individual complaints. It details the methods uniformly applied to 
across both data sets.  These include: the normalization/standardization of government 
departments over the 28 year period; the allocation of years to individual Ombudsman; 
the source of staff numbers and population statistics.  Parts IV and V then make 
transparent the different data assumptions and methods with respect to systemic 
investigations and individual complaints respectively.  
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Part IV explains the reliability of the systemic investigations data set based upon the use 
of a “Master List” of  231 systemic investigations.  The source of this list and its 
reliability are made transparent. The integrity of this data is critical to this study and its 
limitations are therefore clearly identified. This Part then details the steps taken to create 
a data set from the Master List of 231 systemic reports.  In short, each report was read 
and coded for 12 attributes covering its context, process and outcomes.  Part IV itemizes 
and explains each variable extracted in the reports, one case example is provided in the 
Appendix to make assumptions explicit to the reader.   
 
Part V echoes this approach with the data set for individual complaints.  This Part 
explains how the 28 years of data is normalized and identifies the individual complaint 
statistics used by this study. This data set is based upon the statistical records kept by the 
Office.  With some exceptions, these statistics have been maintained fairly uniformly 
over time.   
 
Parts III, IV and V make transparent the accuracy of the data used in this study.  This is 
necessary for reader confidence in the certainty of results.  Importantly, by making clear 
all assumptions Parts III, IV and V ensure that this study may be replicated by future 
research and provide a platform to draw upon jurisdictional and international 




Part II   Introduction to the research design 
 
A  The research question  
 
The central research question is to determine how and to what effect the Office uses 
its systemic investigatory powers.  As noted above the two central hypotheses to be 
tested are: 
 
(a) that the Commonwealth Ombudsman is increasingly using its systemic 
investigatory function to improve government administration;  and  
 
 
(b) that the systemics role (ie: formal reports and/or own motion powers and 
submissions) is linked to number and types of individual complaints. 
 
Both of the above are beliefs traditionally held about the Office.  The first is that the 
Office achieves systemic change and that an avenue for achieving this is through formal 
reports and/or own motion investigations and submissions.  The second is that there is a 
relationship between individual complaints and the systemics investigatory function for 
example, that formal reports and own motion investigations both reduce the number of 
individual complaints in particular areas and that such investigations originate from areas 
where there are large numbers of individual complaints.   
 
To address the research question effectively this study develops 6 research aims: 
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1. To create two longitudinal data sets: one for a defined portion of the  
systemic investigations function of the Office and the other for individual 
complaints. 
 
2. To develop a methodology to allow a comparative evaluation between the 
systemics function and the individual complaint-taking role.    
 
3. To conduct a systematic, quantitative analysis of formal reports and own 
motion investigations and submissions undertaken by the Office across 
identified legislative powers from 1978 to 2005. 
 
4. To assess the quantitative systemic impact of formal reports and own 
motion investigations in terms of impact upon improving public 
administration. 
 
5. To examine how the use of formal reports and own motion investigations 
corresponds to the dual role of the Office as an individual complaint 
handler.  
 
6. To analyse whether the resolution of systemic investigations results in 
less individual complaints through providing a comparative historical 
assessment of the office. 
 12 
 
The first three of these aims are addressed in this paper. 
 
B  Scope of the study: Systemic functions must be measurable 
 
The immediate difficulty is that much of the literature commenting upon the impact of 
ombudsman views the function of improving administration as immeasurable.
26
  
However, to develop a quantitative methodology it is necessary to have measurable 
functions.  This section develops principles upon which specific systemics functions of 
the Office may be classified as measurable or immeasurable for the purposes of a 
quantitative analysis.  
 
To identify what may be measured it must be noted there is no singular universal 
definition of an ombudsman’s systemic functions.  Indeed the phrase “systemic impact” 
or has several possible interpretations according to the literature.  
 
The broadest meaning of what systemic impact means is from the 1991 Review, 
mentioned above which defines systemic change or systemic improvement as being 
“[T]he Ombudsman’s potential to induce broader change in the administrative 
system…”27  The Review states that systemic change means “major reforms to Australian 
public administration” and that these “have been relatively uncommon”.28  This 
conceptualisation accords with the only international study on the systemics role, an 
Alaskan
29
  study which explains that legislative and policy changes were the most 
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measurable systemic impact of an ombudsman. The narrowest concept of systemic 
impact is suggested by a Australian Federal industry ombudsman, the 
Telecommunications Industry Ombudsman (the “TIO”) stating that it “considers an 
effective outcome to a systemic investigation is a suitable change in a provider”s 
behaviour”.30  This “thin” notion is based upon Hill’s research as enunciated by Hertogh 
who states that ombudsman 
 
not only should provide individual redress, but 
are also expected to have an effect on 
administrative action and produce some form of 
“policy impact”: administrative policy changes 
that have consequences into the future and 





At first blush this definition seems contradictory to a narrow approach to defining 
systemic impact however Hertogh goes on to give examples of policy impact as: the 
replacement of misleading or inaccurate forms; the improvement of communication 
within the agency’s clients; a higher quality of service; general improvements to an 
agency’s functioning or better record keeping.  Hertogh states that together with changes 
in agency’s internal rules and regulations these are all examples of policy impact. 
 
 
Thick and thin 
 14 
 
This study places these definitions as to the impact of systemic recommendations made 
by the Office into a gradation from “thick” to “thin”.  This is based upon the distinction 
between policy and procedure.  The thickest form of systemic change (best enunciated by 
the 1991 Review above) refers to administrative reform brought about through changes to 
policy and/or legislation.  The thinnest form of systemic change is procedural change.  
The methodology adopted in this study therefore categorises the systemic impact of the 
ombudsman into thick (policy/legislative) change or thin (procedural) change.   As this 
study begins from a legal perspective it suggests changes in law and policy are the most 
thick and measurable activity of the office with a scale that slides “down” from that point.   
 
This may be done as the Office argues that it may investigate both procedure or matters 
of administration and matters of policy.
32
   For example, in its early reports the Office 
suggests:  
 
It would be absurd if the Ombudsman could 
find, for example, that a Commonwealth prisons 
regulation providing that sleeping arrangements 
for Commonwealth prisoners should be 
communal was unreasonable or unjust or in all 
the circumstances wrong, yet if the same 
arrangements were implemented by an 
administrative “policy” decision of a department 
 15 
the Ombudsman would lack competence to 




Specifically the Office argues that the Ombudsman Act 1976 (Cth) does not exclude a 
matter from being a matter of administration because it is also a matter of policy.
34
   
 
 
Direct and indirect 
 
Having determined that the impact of the Office in terms of systemic change can be 
classified into “thick” and “thin” it is then necessary to determine exactly what, within 
those categories, may be measured. To assist in this process a further category created 
within systemic impact is “direct” as opposed to “indirect” impact.   
 
The distinction between the two has been described by Nebenzhal as “the direct impact of 
the ombudsman is meant the benefit which accrues to his clients – the complainants – 
from his operation; the indirect impact of the ombudsman refers to the benefits accruing 
to others, including the public at large.”35   This study applies Nebenzhal’s 
conceptualization but departs from the notion of direct impact benefiting a complainant 
and instead talks about direct and indirect in terms of the practical ability to measure the 
systemic impact of the operations of the office. It develops a sliding scale between direct 
impact (measurable) and indirect impact (immeasurable).   
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On this scale direct impact is a systemic result which is measurable, such as where the 
Office publishes admonitions in letters and published case notes or, more particularly for 
the purposes of this study where the Office suggests policy or legislative change in 
formal reports, own motion investigations and submissions to government.   
 
At the other end of this scale indirect impact is not measurable. It is more elusive and 
encompasses less tangible functions than does direct impact.  To provide three such 
examples of indirect systemic impact, the first is the role of the Office as a “teacher”36 
where it points out the path of righteousness through the answers demanded in an 
investigation.  Secondly, the function of the Office as a watchdog which was a point 
made in a 1983 study of the Hawaiian ombudsman noting that comments from agencies 
“indicate that even the unjustified complaints tend to make the agencies more careful in 
handling their affairs.”37  Or, at the extreme end on this sliding scale into 




the mere existence of an Ombudsman 
strengthens the citizen’s confidence in public 
administration and has a preventive effect 
favouring an administration based on the 
principles of law, justice and fairness:  the 
citizens know they can seek the assistance of a 
highly qualified, neutral person if they feel they 
have been wronged by the bureaucracy, and the 
administrators will be even more motivated not 
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A. Fig, 1.1 
to give rise to justified complaints which may 
call forth the Ombudsman’s intervention. 38 
 
A further dimension of the difficulty of measuring indirect change is the “extent to which 
the Ombudsman’s Office was instrumental in determining the official decision” as this 
“varies from case to case”.39  This is particularly apparent with the example of Senate 
submissions where it is difficult to ascertain just how influential the input of the Office is 
with respect to certain administrative changes – such as the introduction of the statutory 
scheme Compensation for Detriment Caused by Defective Administration (CDDA) 
established in 1995 which was the result of much lobbying from the Office.
40
    That 
noted, a quantitative analysis demands measurable data and as the continuum progresses 
away from direct and towards indirect such as where the Office supplying submissions to 
law reform bodies the exactness with which input is measurable similarly decreases.    
 
What does this study measure?  
 
This study measures direct systemic change.  Direct improvements are more easily 
measured as they are clearly identified and their impact – in terms of quantity - obvious.  
Within the category of direct systemic change the study classifies the change as “thick” 
or “thin”.   
 
Figure 1.1:  What is measurable: Thick/Direct and Thin/Direct change 
 


































The systemic functions of the Office measured by this study must therefore fall within the 
Direct quadrants (as identified in Figure 1.1).  Two additional points to note are that 
firstly, this study does not measure all functions within this quadrant and secondly, this 
study does not attempt to evaluate the remaining half of the quadrant of “indirect” as this 
is the most difficult impact to both identify and measure.  An example of “thin and 
indirect” would be an informal suggestion for change to an administrative procedure of 
an agency, such as an alteration to a manual.
 41
   An example of “thick and indirect” may 
be where the Office suggests a policy change in an informal meeting.
 
While the ability to 
measure indirect impact is beset with difficulty it should be emphasized that a general 
consensus exists in the literature
42
 that real but immeasurable systemic improvement does 
occur as a result of the public accountability system of which the Office is part.   
 
 
With this in mind, this study isolates instances where it can identify and measure thick 
and direct or thin and direct impacts.   This study therefore limits its focus to a small part 
of the systemic work of the Office and excludes a large proportion of the work of the 
Office that will fall into all four quadrants of Figure 1.1.  The following section defines 
the functions of the Office measured in this study, of these functions only the direct 
impact is measured. 
 
C  Scope of the study:  The systemic functions measured  
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Given the generality of the systemics definitions, Figure 1.2 identifies nine functions of 
the Office that have systemic impact.  This Figure highlights that no singular function of 
the Office is used in isolation to deal with systemic issues.   
 21 
 





















As identified in Figure 1.2 the general definition of systemic impact will capture most of 
the functions of the Office.  Indeed, improvements in administrative decision-making 
may result from any singular or combination of the above functions of the Office.   
 
To take the example of the individual complaint function of the Office, an individual 
complaint may result in systemic change. This point is captured in the following quotes:   
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Mr Norm Geshcke a former Victorian Ombudsman: 
 
The complainant alleges an injustice has 
occurred; my role is to investigate his allegations 
and determine whether an injustice has occurred.  
If so, to have it redressed. If not, say so and clear 
the agency.  If so, and it arises through bad 





Professor Dennis Pearce, a former Commonwealth Ombudsman: 
 
The Ombudsman is primarily concerned with 
complaints about specific decisions.  However, 
he also fulfils the wider role of improving 
procedures and bringing about desirable changes 
to legislation and policy.  This is achieved 
through two avenues.  First and most commonly, 
the receipt of complaints from members of the 
public may reveal an inequity in the pattern of 
difficulties that should not be allowed to 
continue.  A single complaint is often sufficient 
to highlight a deficiency in legislation or agency 
policy that needs to be dealt with before other 
persons are adversely affected.  Second, the 
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Ombudsman is empowered to initiate 
investigations into matters of defective 
administration of his own motion.  This power is 
used when a general issue comes to the 
Ombudsman’s attention that he perceives will 





Indeed, there are numerous examples of indirect systemic change occurring throughout 
the history of the Office sourced from Annual Reports, for example the 2003-2004 
Annual Report in the case study titled “improvements to policies” states: 
 
Ms F complained that during her time in 
Australian Federal Police (AFP) protective 
custody she was refused access to a translator.  
Ms F also complained about the time and 
manner in which the AFP released her from the 
ACT City Watch House. 
 
The matter was referred to the AFP and was 
successfully conciliated through the AFP”s 
workplace resolution process.  As a result of this 
complaint, the AFP made some improvements to 





Also identified in Figure 1.2 is the point that an overlap of each of the functions of the 
Office may inform or be the basis for such change.  So a major project may have arisen 
from an individual complaint, result in a formal report originating in an own motion 
investigation that may then form the basis for a law reform submission.   
 
An examination of each of the nine key functions represented in the above diagram 
follows.
46
 This explanation identifies that in terms of the research aims of this empirical 
study only three of these functions which are the more formal investigatory functions - 
the own motions and formal reports functions and submissions - are classified as direct 




As Hill notes the mere fact that an individual complainant was helped does not mean the 
agency was affected in any important way.
47
    Indeed, a selected example of a case study 
provided in the Annual Reports of the Office illustrate this point:  
 
A Member of Parliament complained about the ATO”s imposition of general interest charge (GIC) on a 
constituent who had previously been led to believe by ATO staff that no such charge would apply.  One 
day after the Ombudsman staff inquired about this complaint, the ATO had contacted the constituent, 
clarified the situation, apologized for any inconvenience, and arranged to have the GIC remitted.  The ATO 
then undertook subsequent follow-up action to confirm that the remitted GIC was properly credited to the 
constituent’s bank account.48  
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In the above case although the individual complainant received a positive outcome, the 
decision did not lead to any change in the operation of the Department.  Conversely, in 
the case study below, although the complainant received a negative outcome the resultant 
decision did influence the operation of the department as a whole.  
 
Mr G”s decision to use an Australian sounding name rather than his own Arab one led to his name being 
incorrectly recorded by DILGEA on his citizenship certificate.  Unfortunately, he chose a Jewish name 
which caused some problems when he wanted to return to the country of his birth to register his children 
there. 
I did not recommend the issue of a replacement certificate recording Mr G”s true name, because there was 
no evidence of defective administration by DILGEA. However, I did raise with the Secretary my concerns 
about the tendency for DILGEA to apply the guidelines on citizenship certificates rigidly, even though the 
Act conferred a discretion on delegates.  I was promised that my concerns would be taken into account 




Of course this must not exclude the suggestion that individual complaints will lead to 
systemic improvements.  Arguably the remedies sought after any investigation by 
individual Ombudsman are always twofold – to dissolve the injustice to the individual 
and to improve administrative methods so that the same complaint does not reoccur.   
 
Individual complaints are not used as a measure of systemic impact in this study.  This is 
due to the following:  firstly, this function of the Office spreads across the entire range of 
Figure 1.1 including thin and indirect to thick and direct.  As the Office does not 
consistently identify when individual complaints may have resulted in thick or thin 
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systemic change this means that much systemic impact will not be measurable acrosthe 
entire four quadrants.   Secondly, the Ombudsman Act 1976 (Cth) provides that a 
complaint may be made orally and dealt with informally, as written complaints may also 
be.  This is the case even where individual complaints raise systemic issues.  Again this 
means systemic impact may result from an individual complaint
50
 however it is not 




While an ombudsman may lack coercive powers it has been suggested that ombudsman 
may change agency behaviour through publicity, as an ultimate sanction of the office is 
to make offenders publicly known. Publicity mechanisms include special and annual 
reports to Parliament and general media coverage through speeches, media releases, 
television, radio, internet and newspapers.  Of course this may have varying impact as 
Philippa Smith, a former Ombudsman, notes that “the power of an Ombudsman in reality 
comes from the potential power of embarrassment and the credibility and thoroughness of 
the work done” and  “[A]ll an ombudsman can do then is report the situation and hope 
the resultant publicity shames the agency into action.  Ombudsman have had mixed 
success with their recommendations - some agencies seem to have no shame.”51 
 
There is broad agreement in the literature that publicity may force an agency to action 
and instances can be provided as to when and how the Office effects persuasive influence 
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on agencies through publicity, as another former Commonwealth Ombudsman, Professor 
Dennis Pearce states: 
 
In one particular case where I had a very long 
debate with the agency concerned and we were 
not getting anywhere…I outlined my options.  
One of them was to go public and the agency 
immediately changed its mind.
 52
   
 
This view has been supported by external agencies such as government departments, as  
Gerry Ryan a former Secretary of Australia Post notes: 
 
There is already a powerful parliamentary 
disclosure measure available to the Ombudsman 
in the case of inappropriate responses by 
government agencies to his inquiries, his 
findings and his recommendations…such public 





The barrier to measuring this function within the parameters of this study is that it is 
“indirect”. Due to the constraints of this study (as outlined below) it is not possible to 
measure whether a suggestion made to an agency is adopted because of publicity or other 





The notion of major projects is formalized in 1992 when a Major Projects section is 
established.  As described in the words of the then Ombudsman Philippa Smith: 
 
The Major Projects Section’s brief is to 
investigate cases which raise complex systemic 
or other administrative issues; allegations of 
serious malpractice; and cases involving large 
amounts of money.  It may also conduct primary 
investigations into serious complaints 
concerning the AFP, including complaints about 
the AFP from or on behalf of Aborigines which 





By 1995 about 150 important systemic issues from complaints about various agencies 
had been identified, and 25 have been taken up as Major Projects.
55
   
 




this year also saw the consolidation of our major 
projects work, and the Major Projects team 
pursued over 50 major projects, involving 
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complex cases requiring intensive investigation.  
Most of these projects raised matters of broader 
public interest affecting thousands of other 
citizens.  Many other systemic issues are 
pursued during the course of our general 
investigation work. Through these projects we 
have achieved significant reforms to improve the 
quality and fairness of public administration.  
Appendix A provides a listing of our major 




The work of the Major Projects section peaks under Philippa Smith”s stewardship.  By 
1998-99 the Major Projects section completed 6 major investigations,
57
 by the end of Ron 
McLeod”s term as ombudsman in 2003 the section has merged into a special 
investigations section. 
 
While clearly having a systemic approach the exclusion of Major Projects from this study 
is due to the use of the terminology “major project” resulting in internal confusion.  A 
1996 internal Office report into the Major Projects function states: 
 
While some members of the Office have a clear 
view of what is meant when they use the term 
“major project”, others have called for 
clarification.  The most common area of concern 
is the difference between major projects and 
 30 
systemics, although there is also some confusion 
about the relationship between major projects, 





The outcome is an absence of consistent identification of formal reports as Major 
Projects.  Further, over the 28 year period the “Major Project” terminology applied to a 
section which existed for around 10 years and during this period Major Projects were 
generally classified under the broad definition of systemic investigations.  As noted 
below, in order to be systematic this study evaluates formal reports  - some of these are 
described by the Office as major projects (ie: the  investigation into the Nomad crash) 
however in terms of analysis they become measurable and “direct” only when they reach 
the status of formal reports.  This is done in the interests of promoting internal 
consistency and a accurate historical comparative analysis. 
   
 
Meetings with agencies 
 
The Office has traditionally followed a structure of placing investigators into teams who 
work with the agency they investigate.  This results in Office meetings with agencies that 
involve various degrees of formality. Meetings can range from case investigations to less 
formal discussions as to how to alter procedures or change policies arising from a 





In order to foster cooperation the office has 
sought to establish lines of communication with 
agencies which are not limited to resolve single 
complaints…Regular meetings with agencies 
provide a means of monitoring processes in 
relation to individual complaints, of discussing 
issues germane to those complaints, and of 





Clearly such meetings may result in systemic improvements to the way an agency carries 
out its administration and processes.  However being “indirect” in nature the exclusion of 
this function from this study is due to the inability to measure such change at this point 
due to restraints such as lack of resources (see below) that may enable the investigator to 




An important systemic role is the contribution to law reform and policy through 
submissions to inquiries. Submissions to recent parliamentary enquiries include: 
March 2006 – Commonwealth and Taxation Ombudsman to Joint Committee of Public 
Accounts and Audit: Inquiry reviewing “Certain tax matters” within Australia 
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 March 2006 – Commonwealth Ombudsman to Senate Legal and Constitutional 
Committee:  Inquiry into the provision of the Telecommunications (Interception) 
Amendment Bill 2006  
 
While it is not always clear whether the impact of such submissions will result or cause 
change they are included in this study as they are “direct” and therefore capable of 
measurement. Submissions are also included as they are one of the three major systemic 
functions of the Office identified by the current Commonwealth Ombudsman, Professor 
John McMillan being:   (1) to initiate and conduct own motion investigations,  (2) to 
make suggestions and recommendations to agencies and (3) to make submissions to 
government and parliamentary inquiries.
60
 The Office has listed submissions and due to 
itemization in Annual Reports some data triangulation is possible to verify the reliability 
of the data.  
 
Member of the Administrative Review Council (ARC) 
 
The Office is an ex-officio member of the ARC. The ARC is responsible for overseeing 
and monitoring Australia’s system of administrative review.61  Membership of this body 
provides the Office both with recognition of the role performed in the landscape of 
administrative review and the ability to contribute to systemic change of administrative 
review in Australia.  For example, two recent projects of the ARC are the investigative 
powers of government agencies and the scope of judicial review. This role is “indirect” 
and therefore not measurable within the confines of this study. 
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Audit compliance role 
 
A growing function of the Office is compliance function investigations.
62
  This is a 
systemic function in that it extends to “continued improvement in the management of 
controlled operations”.63 Under the Surveillance Devices Act 2004 (Cth) the Office 
inspects records that law enforcement authorities are required to compile when using 
surveillance devices in criminal investigations.  This annual function exists with respect 
to reports and recommendations to monitor the compliance of the ACC and the AFP with 
controlled operations.   This power now extends to the records of the Building Industry 
taskforce under the Workplace Relations Act 1996 (Cth). For the purposes of this 
empirical study, although “direct” the audit compliance role is not included.  Its growth is 
relatively recent and does not therefore lend itself to a longitudinal study. Notably this 
function is a worthwhile focus for future research.  
 
Own motion investigation 
 
This is a “direct” systemic function of the Office measured by this study. This power will 
most often present as a formal report under section 15 of the Ombudsman Act 1976 (Cth) 
and may also translate into other formal reporting mechanisms (ss16-19, 35A 





Section 5(1)(b) provides that the Office “(b) may, of his or her own motion, investigate 
any action, being action that relates to a matter of administration, taken either before or 
after the commencement of this Act by a Department or by a prescribed authority.”  This 
section allows the Office to act as an “on the spot” auditor or trouble shooter. Section 
5(1)(b) of the Ombudsman Act 1976 (Cth) empowers the Office to investigate, on an own 
motion, action that relates to a matter of administration:  
 
The Act also provides that, in addition to investigating individual 
complaints, I may investigate a matter of my own motion.  The 
own motion power may be used, for example, to investigate 
deficiencies of a systemic character (that is, where it appears 
there are problems associated with an agency”s practices, 
policies, or procedures).  Such an investigation may be 
undertaken because a specific complaint has pointed to the 
possibility of some underlying systemic problem or because the 
receipt of a number of complaints on the same matter has 




This power may be used to investigate “matters of administration of a “systemic” nature 
where it appears that there may be some endemic operational flaw within an agency.”65   
 
Such own motion powers are used sparingly
66
 as Ron McLeod notes it is unusual for a 
formal statutory power such as section 5 to be invoked by the Office as “[I]n general 
terms, the Ombudsman Act 1976 has proved an effective legislative basis for the 
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operations of the Office.  However, practices have developed which allow the Office to 
deal with many complaints in a highly informal and effective fashion which was not 
envisioned when the Act was first drafted.”67  This is because while the legislation 
contemplates that a complaint can only be finalized by either the exercise of a statutory 
discretion to investigate or not to investigate further, or by making a report, many 
investigations are finalized by an investigator talking to the agency’s contact officer and 
arranging a satisfactory outcome.   
 
Formal reports and reports in the public interest 
 
While these are technically distinguished from own motions, in practice own motions 
will normally result in formal reports.  These are classified as “direct” and are measured 
by this study and include the legislative powers which pertain to the Office acting within 
its jurisdiction with respect to the Australian Federal Police and also as the Australian 
Capital Territory Ombudsman. Under this function are section 15, 16, 17 reports and 
reports made public under s35A of the Ombudsman Act 1976 (Cth).  The reports are 
where the Office can conclude an investigation by reporting to an agency and 
recommending that further action be taken.   
 
Section 15 of the Ombudsman Act 1976 provides that a report can be prepared if the 
Ombudsman is of the opinion that the administrative action under investigation was 
unlawful, unreasonable, unjust, oppressive, improperly discriminatory, or otherwise 
wrong or unsupported by the facts; was not properly explained by an agency; or was 
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based on a law that was unreasonable, unjust, oppressive or improperly discriminatory. In 
such circumstance the Office may determine that an administrative action is defective. 
This provision authorizes a special ground for review under which the Office can impugn 
a statutory or common law administrative action and has the capacity to make the Office 
a legislative scrutineer or possible human rights enforcer.  This section furnishes the 
Office with the power to make formal reports, containing recommendations to the 
agencies and departments concerned.  A copy of this Report also is provided to the 
relevant Minister.   
 
While classified as “direct” it must be noted that even under this section the Office 
cannot force an agency to follow its recommendations.  Under s15(4) the Office “may 
request the Department or prescribed authority to which the report is furnished to furnish 
to him or her, within a specified time, particulars of any action that it proposes to take 
with respect to the matters and recommendations included in the report.” Section 15 
allows the Office to make suggestions arising out of the investigation to any other 
agency, body or person.   
 
In addition section 35A of the Ombudsman Act 1976 allows reports to be released in the 
public interest.  Philippa Smith articulated this as being “important to allow an 
understanding of what the Ombudsman does and to allow debate on important issues of 




In terms of sanction the greatest power of the Office lies in sections 16 and 17.  Where, if 
the agency has not acted upon the recommendations, the Ombudsman may make a report 
to the Prime Minister under section 16 and may also report to Parliament under s17.   The 
Office notes however that   
 
experience indicates that the Ombudsman’s 
formal reporting powers, conferred pursuant to 
sections 16 and 17 of the Ombudsman Act, have 
not had the persuasive value that the Parliament 
might have expected when the legislation was 
enacted.  Although there have been only two 
reports under section 17 of the Act, there have 
been a number of other occasions on which an 
agency has resisted a recommendation made by 
an Ombudsman pursuant to section 15 and 
appears not to have felt any reluctance in doing 
so by reason of the fact that further reports could 










This study measures three out of the nine possible system changing functions identified 
in Figure 1.2.  These are own motions, formal reports and submissions.  In some ways the 
distinction between these three categories is artificial.  For example an own motion – as 
characterized by this study – will generally be identified herein as a formal report, as own 
motion investigations carried out under the legislation (section 5 of the Ombudsman Act 
1976) will appear in this data set as a formal report – normally under section 15 of the 
Ombudsman Act 1976).  The essential point, returned to below, is that this study 
examines only a portion of the Office’s role as change agent and evaluates its frequency.   
 
 
D  Origin of Data 
 
This study uses two data sources:  
 
(a) formal reports and own motion investigations and submissions listed in the 
“Master List” (provided by the Office and coded by the author as discussed 
below) and accessed via the Office; and  
(b) the statistics for individual complaints contained in each Annual Report from 
1976-2005 (compiled by the author as discussed below).  
 
 
A study of formal reports/own motion investigations  
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This empirical analysis examines formal reports and/or submissions and/or own motion 
investigations completed by the Commonwealth Ombudsman and the Australian Capital 
Territory Ombudsman pursuant to the following legislative powers: 
 
Sections  5, 15, 16,17,18 & 35A Ombudsman Act 1976  (Cth) 
Section 18 Ombudsman Act 1989 (ACT) 
Sections  46, 31, 34, 36, 50 Complaints (Australian Federal Police) Act 1981 (Cth) 
 
As explained above, the investigations based upon the above legislative powers used in 
this methodology are located in a list of “Completed Projects” as created by the Office.70  
It is therefore important to note that the reports forming the basis of this study are 
selected upon their membership of this “Completed Projects List” rather than by their 
legislative assignation.  Through data triangulation this list is refined and a finalized table 
of systemic investigations used by this study termed the “Master List” which refers to 
written reports from which the data set is coded. 
 
A study of individual complaints 
 
This empirical analysis also examines any link between individual complaints and 
systemic investigations.  Every Annual Report of the Office contains a statistical report of 
individual complaints.  This study standardizes the statistics in these reports and itemizes 
them into portfolio, year and individual Ombudsman to allow meaningful analysis and 
comparisons of the longitudinal operation of the Office.  The study also uses the statistics 
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contained in the Annual Reports of the ACT Ombudsman from 1989 to current day to 
identify the individual complaints of that role. Assumptions made in standardizing the 
statistical records of individual complaints are explained in Part V.   
 
 
E     Parameters of the study 
 
Parameter One: Type of systemic investigation  studied   
 
The first parameter is that the research question is confined to the three systemic 
functions of the Office identified above: formal reports, submissions and own motion 
investigations. As Figure 1.2 identifies there are a wide variety of techniques used by the 
Office to create systemic change.   In fact, formal reports, submissions and own motion 





The office has always operated on the basis that 
efficient and effective complaint resolution was 
more likely in an atmosphere of cooperation 
rather than one of confrontation.  Consequently, 
while it has never eschewed vigorous debate or 
the use of its formal powers where necessary or 
appropriate, it has sought to resolve issues and 





The Office pursues a policy of aversion to formal investigations, as Professor Jack 
Richardson, the first Ombudsman notes:
 
 
Almost from the beginning in 1977 we 
embarked upon a policy of attempting to deal 
with complaints on an informal basis rather than 
to invoke the formal investigatory processes 
specified in the Ombudsman Act.  We felt the 
handling of complaints by informal means 
placed less strain on the resources of 
departments and prescribed authorities and at the 
same time did not prejudice the interests of our 
complainants in any way.  If it was clear from 
the outset that if a complaint was of a very 
serious nature or would involve substantial 
investigation resources, or if it became apparent 
during the course of an informal enquiry that an 
agency was resisting the Ombudsman we did not 
hesitate to embark upon a formal investigation.  
But this was usually unnecessary.
 72
 
The above policy is put into practice as the decision to proceed with a systemic 
investigation is discretionary and ombudsman are reluctant to proceed to formal 
investigations as Professor Dennis Pearce states: 
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Where minor irregularities are detected or where 
there is only circumstantial evidence, I 
sometimes suggest that Telecom give the 
customer the benefit of the doubt and waive or 
reduce disputed charges.  To my 
disappointment, my proposals are not always 
accepted by Telecom, but I accept that 
judgments in this areas are necessarily 
subjective when the available evidence is not 
strong enough to justify me issuing a formal 




Indeed it has been suggested by Professor Dennis Pearce a former Commonwealth 
Ombudsman that the own motion power should be exercised with care for two reasons – 
as it is inappropriate for the Ombudsman to investigate matters on his or her own volition 
that have a high policy-political content as “[T]he Ombudsman not only must be 
apolitical but must also clearly appear to be so” and  “the Ombudsman needs to be careful 
with the commitment of resources and dealing with complaints from members of the 
public should be first priority.”74  More recently in 1997-1998 Ron McLeod observes that 
“the Ombudsman Act contemplates that a complaint can only be finalized by either the 
exercise of a statutory discretion not to investigate or not to investigate further, or by 
making a report...The legislative provisions do not reflect this type of outcome nor the 
informality or speediness of the process…”. 75 
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Formal reports – which constitute the backbone of this study - are therefore a very small 
component of the Office”s work. This conclusion is based upon qualitative research.  
Such qualitative analysis identified some systemic statistics in Annual Reports such as 
when Professor Dennis Pearce states that “[D]uring 1989-90 in 83 instances some change 
was made to a practice or procedure and 23 changes to a law or policy were made 
following my investigations.  In many cases it was unnecessary for me to proceed to the 
stage of making a formal recommendation.”76 Further this research identified that a 
possible cause of the small number of systemic issues is due to the prescribed formal 
investigation legislative sections whereby the Office provides the agency with an 
opportunity to review and discuss its findings.  This process is geared against the issuing 
of formal legislative reports. As explained by the then Ombudsman Geoffrey Kolts: 
 
Before proceeding to a report critical of an 
agency, I am required under sub-section 8(5) of 
the Ombudsman Act to give the agency an 
opportunity to make submissions.  In practice I 
fulfill this requirement by providing a draft of 
my conclusions and inviting any submissions on 
it (it is my practice also to foreshadow any 
appropriate recommendations I might make if I 
confirm my draft conclusions).  This has the 
effect of ensuring that only where the agency 
rejects my findings do I have a need to continue 
to a formal report under section 15.  In many 
cases that does not occur because the agency 
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concerned takes appropriate action, on receipt of 
my draft comments, to resolve the complaint.  
Indeed, the number of formal section 15 reports 
completed during the year was small (5).  In 
other cases, I may decide to modify my 
conclusions and recommendations in light of a 
submission.  Where this occurs, it may be 
necessary to provide a further draft report to the 




Further, Philippa Smith notes that “[O]ut of the 7643 investigations completed last year, 
only six proceeded to formal section 15 reports, and none were referred to the Prime 
Minister or Parliament.” 78 In the following year she similarly states that “[T]his year the 
office received about 22, 000 complaints and only issued 9 section 15 reports.”79  There 
is also descriptive commentary in Annual Reports such as that by the then Ombudsman 
Alan Cameron who observes that “[A] formal report and recommendations are seldom 
necessary as agencies are usually willing to remedy the problems revealed by my 
investigations.” 80 Such commentary indicates that formal reports are a small portion of 
the Office’s systemic work. 
 
The above observations and inclinations of individual Ombudsman as to the small use of 
the formal powers is important due to the fact that the use of such powers is an exercise 
of discretion, and discretion exists at every stage of the investigative process.  For 
example, to return to section 5 of the Ombudsman Act 1976 there are two means under 
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that section by which an investigation by the Ombudsman may commence.  Section 
5(1)(a) states that where there is a complaint the ombudsman “shall investigate” and 
section 5(1)(b) allows the Ombudsman discretion to investigate of his or her own motion.  
Section 6 operates to introduce discretion in both subsections of 5(1).  It provides a 
wide
81
 discretion not to investigate or if the ombudsman has started to investigate to not 
investigate further.  It also allows the Ombudsman at any time prior to or during an 
investigation to determine whether or not and when to pursue an investigation under 
s5(1)(a) or (b).  Indeed the Act assists in the exercise of discretion by allowing the 
Ombudsman to undertake a preliminary inquiry under s7A.   
The comparatively small usage of own motions, submissions and formal reports does not  
undermine the value or accuracy of this study. Indeed, the very reticence to use formal 
reports exhibited throughout the history of the Office actually makes them an ideal focus 
for a novel study into systemic impact.  This is because they are definable and “direct”.  
In terms of a quantitative analysis the small number of investigations means that a data 
set may be created from the Master List which lists the 231 reports used by this study.  
This study does not refute that there are a myriad of other mechanisms which may result 
in systemic change – indeed these have been explained above - rather it provides a in-
depth analysis of a snapshot of what the Office may or may not achieve in the formal 
reports provided for under its enabling legislation.   
Parameter Two:  Adoption of a quantitative measure  
As noted earlier there is a perspective in ombudsman literature of incongruity in applying 
a numerical statistical approach for what may be viewed as the immeasurable outcome of 
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improving administrative justice.  An aim of this research is to suggest that such 
categorization is possible and that it is useful to quantify results, impact and outcomes of 
systemic investigations.   
As previously stated, the adoption of a numerical measure provides a quantitative 
longitudinal comparison study which uses content analysis as its basis.   The benefit of a 
longitudinal approach as stated by Danet is that a “one-time reading of any of these 
measures on the functioning of any ombudsman’s office is far less meaningful than 
longitudinal monitoring in which changes over time are carefully studied for emerging 
trends.”82 The benefit of a quantitative approach is its ability to measure past outcomes 
and predict future variances.  For example the data presented in this study could be 
analysed to determine whether innovations such as the Special Tax Adviser commencing 
operations in April 1995 (with a resulting increase of 145% in complaints) has an impact 
upon individual complaint numbers and/or systemic investigations. It may also predict 
what the future totals of individual complaints taken by the Office will be and in what 
portfolios.  
 
A quantitative approach allows exploration between computed variables over time and 
cross-sectionally.  This form of research is typically associated with the process of 
enumerative induction. Of course, the conceptualisation of this study within a 
quantitative paradigm has disadvantages – it runs a risk of losing sight of the entire 
picture by reducing the notion of systemic to a subset of statistics; that will oversimplify 
social reality; stripping away the context from the data.
83
  For this reason this study 
utilized qualitative research methods examine the notion of systemic investigations 
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holistically in order to understand the context of its operation.  This research uses 
qualitative research methods to explore the validity of assumptions made about 
relationships found to be statistically significant.
84
  Qualitative research techniques have 
been used in this empirical study in two accepted ways, firstly to check the external 
validity of the quantitative assertions and secondly as a precursor to the quantitative 
work.
85
  Textual material and informal interview has primarily been used for this 
purpose.
86
      
 
The quantitative evaluation is therefore integrated with qualitative research design to 
“triangulate” the results.  The logic being to both check the findings of the quantitative 
study and to attempt to explain the broad relationships established between the variables.  
For example the qualitative use of documentary data such as the Annual Reports of the 
Office, government pronouncements and proceedings allows the statistical results to be 
explained.  The Annual Reports
87
 of the Office provide information on budget resources 
and decisions made with respect to the pursuit of systemic investigations in light of 
scarce resources – information which can amplify certainty as to why the use of systemic 
investigations may have altered throughout the history of the Office.  Data triangulation 
is therefore useful on a number of levels. It allows for checking the findings of the 
quantitative study and assists in checking the accuracy and the limitations of the 
information used.  Most importantly it provides a greater understanding of the meaning 
and context of behaviour.  Individual Ombudsman may have different perceptions of the 
use and extent of their own motion powers or perhaps more importantly, have been 
hampered by resource constraints or a lack of a full term spent in the Office.  Such factors 
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are ascertained from documentary histories and applied to enhance the validity of the 
observations made from the quantitative data.  
 
Importantly there are limits to the ability of the researcher to effectively triangulate the 
data.  The Master List used is not complete and may not detail all reports and all 
submissions.  Indeed only 21 out of the 231 formal reports are submissions.  While data 
triangulation using the Annual Reports renders it certain that the Office undertook more 
submissions than 21 submissions over its 28 year period the list was confined to those 21 




The above parameters make clear the strengths and weakness of the methodology used.  
This transparency enables this study to be applied to evaluate other ombudsman with 
systemic functions. For example, following the recent initiative of the 
Telecommunications Industry Ombudsman to appoint a Systemic Complaints Officer and 
introduce a Systemic Complaints Procedure the TIO states “we have not yet been able to 
devise a methodology for measuring the extent of that success.  It is possible that 
measuring the success of some aspects is not possible, while the cost of measuring others 
would simply be excessive.”88  This study attempts to fill this gap by proffering the 
possibility that a quantitative measure of systemic success of an ombudsman may be 




Part III  Explaining the research method – assumptions applied to both 
systemic investigations and to individual complaints  
 
Each Annual Report since the inception of the Office details its activities, including 
statistical tables on matters such as individual complaints.  Additional information which 
can be drawn from Annual Reports of the Office includes budget and staff numbers.  
External figures which may be relevant to evaluating an ombudsman such as population 
figures may be drawn from authorized areas such as the Australian Bureau of Statistics.
89
  
However, over the span of almost 30 years, there are differences in the way in which 
information and statistics have been captured.  Such variances include changes in 
jurisdiction of the Office and changes in the names of government departments.  In order 
to conduct a comparative analysis of the statistics over this period, assumptions have 
been made to standardize data.  This Part explains the assumptions made which apply 
equally to both systemic investigations and individual complaints. 
 
A Standardisation of government departments 
 
Complaint statistics and commentary in Annual Reports is on the basis of the Department 
name at the time.  As Government department names have changed and portfolio 
rearrangements have occurred between 1977-2005 complaint statistics attributed to one 
department in any given year may be placed in a different department the following year.  
As noted by Professor Jack Richardson the then Ombudsman:  
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There are risks in comparing too closely 
apparent trends from year to year in the number 
of complaints we receive about alleged actions 
of particular departments and authorities.  Not 
only are such bodies abolished and created from 
time to time by the government of the day, but 
even without change of name their function can 
be varied from year to year or within a year, 
while major government initiatives administered 
by a body can precipitate sudden surges in the 




This risk applies to both systemic investigations and individual complaints.  This study 
has therefore had to identify how to overcome this danger and normalize and track the 
information in Annual Reports against departments accurately and effectively over time.  
 
In essence this study has taken the major area of individual complaint from each 
department and tracked it through 1977-2005 in an effort to normalize the statistics 
through nullifying any name changes and/or portfolio changes.  So, for example, 
complaints about payments for higher degree tertiary study are treated consistently over 
the 28 year period as belonging to the portfolio of Social Security even though in the 
early years of the Office such complaints are recorded against the education department. 
This is because they are classified by complaint type and from the prism of viewing the 
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function of departments today and applying that categorization retrospectively. This 
allows this study to compare like with like in terms of the two data sets.  To overcome 
various department anomalies, this study redistributes complaints statistics and formal 






Australian Federal Police 
Defence 
Australian Capital Territory  
Other 
 
In relation to the systemics investigations data set an additional “All” category was 
inserted. 
 
The identification and selection of the above portfolios therefore serves the dual purpose 
of nullifying the effect of name changes over time and allows the reader to compare like 
with like over the historical time span selected for this study.  For the purposes of 
transparency, a snapshot is provided in the Appendix of the historical list which tables the 
Department names/portfolios that have been included in each key category for the 
 52 






This study covers three separate legislative instruments: 
Ombudsman Act 1976  (Cth) 
Ombudsman Act 1989 (ACT) 
Complaints (Australian Federal Police) Act 1981 (Cth) 
 
The Ombudsman Act 1976 (Cth) which established the Office is largely without 
amendment.  Certain powers have been added – for example the role of Defence Force 
Ombudsman and the disclosure of information/public interest power in section 35A.  
Such additions do not alter the premises of this study, as for example, the Defence Force 
Ombudsman is the same person as the Commonwealth Ombudsman and therefore any 
specialized reports by the Defence Force Ombudsman are attributed to the sitting 
Commonwealth Ombudsman.  
 
The ACT Ombudsman was created under the Ombudsman Act 1989 (ACT).  This 
separate jurisdiction is incorporated through the segregation of complaint numbers both 
individual and own motion into an ACT portfolio prior to 1989.  This means that the 
numbers continue to be separately recorded when the separate ACT Ombudsman Annual 
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Reports are issued from 1989 onwards. This allows for a comparison of ACT own 
motions and also provides the ability to do so with links to budgetary considerations.   
 
Similarly to the ACT the complaints about the AFP are tracked from inception and then 
individually under the Complaints (Australian Federal Police) Act 1981 (Cth)  which was 




C  Individual Ombudsman and allocation of years 
 
Throughout the 28 years under study seven individuals have held the position of 
Ombudsman: 
 
Professor Jack Richardson 1977-1985 
Geoffrey Kolts 1986-87 
Professor Dennis Pearce 1988-1991 
Alan Cameron 1991-1992 
Philippa Smith 1993-1998 
Ron McLeod 1998-2003 
Professor John McMillan 2003-current  
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It is assumed that the individual Ombudsman has responsibility for all specialist and 
investigative functions within the Office.  Thus this study will attribute a report to the 
person occupying the position of Ombudsman even when the person who submits/signs 
off is not the Ombudsman.  As an example throughout the operation of the Office there 
have been several persons in an acting role while presumably the Ombudsman has been 
on leave. In such situations the report is attributed to the official Ombudsman.  
 
As far as possible this study attempts to make transparent what a quantitative approach 
may “hide”.  For example a “hidden” fact is that the formal reports/submissions/own 
motions and individual complaints resolved in this study are attributed to the incumbent 
Ombudsman whereas they may actually have been carried out by a previous ombudsman.   
The rule of this study is to attribute the Ombudsman submitting the report with 
Ombudsman status for that year.   
 
There are however occasions when an Ombudsman is acting only part of the year and not 
attributed with report.  The principle applied is that if less than half year by the “new 
ombudsman” who submits that years Annual Report than the previous or “old” 
ombudsman is attributed with that year and is attributed with the report and individual 
complaints.  In six of the 28 years the Ombudsman who sign the Annual Report is not 
attributed with that year, rather the their predecessor remains named as responsible: 
 
1985/86  - Jack Richardson attributed as Ombudsman for this study (Geoffrey Kolts 
submits Annual Report – year of acting Ombudsman) 
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1987/88 – Geoffrey Kolts attributed as Ombudsman for this study (Dennis Pearce 
submits Annual Report - takes over in February  1988)  
 
1990/91 – Dennis Pearce attributed as Ombudsman for this study (Alan Cameron submits 
Annual Report – takes over in April 1991)  
 
1992/1993 – Alan Cameron attributed as Ombudsman for this study (Philippa Smith 
submits Annual Report - takes over May 1993) 
 
1997/1998 – Philippa Smith attributed as Ombudsman for this study (Ron McLeod 
submits Annual Report - takes over in February 1998) 
 
2002/2003 – Ron McLeod attributed as Ombudsman for this study (John McMillan 
submits Annual Report - takes over in March 2003)  
 




A Assumption One – usage of “Master List” 
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The fact that a methodology is possible in researchable terms, is needed and should be 
developed does not mean that the path towards it is clear and unfettered. The major 
impediment to conducting a scientific methodology into the systemic investigations of 
the Office is the traditional self-proclaimed focus upon individual complaints.  In 
ombudsman practice the first and basic instrument of self-evaluation is the keeping of 
records of cases and contacts.  The Office has consistently engaged in self assessment as 
evidenced through the keeping and analyzing of records through the collection and 
publication of information in Annual Reports;
91
 through the engaging of external 
commercial consultants and the commissioning of surveys;
 92
 carrying out studies of its 
own and by facing the external scrutiny of external parliamentary enquiry.  The focus 
upon individual complaints dictates that the above information collation and analysis is 
consistently targeted at individual complaints rather than the systemic investigative 
function.  For example, over the thirty years of the Office each Annual Report contains 
statistics as to complaints and complainants and since the early 1990s the Office has 
initiated the long term collection and recording of data through consultants carrying out 
client satisfactions surveys for individual complainants.  This emphasis in record keeping 
reflects the norms and assumptions of the Office that its core function is the resolution of 
individual complaints.   
 
In contrast, with respect to detailing systemic impact, the Annual Reports of the Office 
generally use a descriptive style such as case studies.
93
  These case studies are selectively 
chosen and tend to positively spin the workings and effectiveness of the Office with 
respect to systemic change.
94
   From year to year the quantity of reporting is variable.  At 
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most there may be a whole chapter in an Annual Report devoted to the systemic impact  
of the Office while at the other end of the spectrum there are years where the Annual 
Reports make no mention of systemic impact at all.
95
   
 
To overcome these inconsistencies this study uses Annual Reports qualitatively and 
instead relies upon as its data source an original summary of completed projects titled 
“List of projects, formal reports and submissions”.  This list is referred to as the 
“Completed Projects List” and an example is contained in the Appendix.  This Completed 
Projects List, prepared by the Office for internal purposes, is a record keeping exercise 
listing formal reports in chronological order.  The Completed Projects List contains a 
listing of the names and other non-identifying information of each file identified by the 
Office an own motion investigation or formal report or submissions to bodies such as to 
law reform commissions.   
 
The formulation of this Completed Projects List provides some insight into the systemic 
investigatory role of the Office. While it should be noted that this list was not prepared by 
the Office with “systemics” (or a study such as this) in mind the choice of inclusions and 
exclusions from the list provides for an examination of the classifications and categories 
the Office itself uses. For example, as would be expected the majority of the reports 
contained in this list are investigations which flow from the Office acting according to the 
jurisdiction provided under the Ombudsman Act 1976, including in the roles of Taxation 
Ombudsman, when investigating action taken by the Australian Taxation Office; and the 
role of Defence Force Ombudsman, when investigating action arising from the service of 
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a member of the Australian Defence Force. Importantly, it also includes formal reports 
and own motions under other legislation which grants the Ombudsman jurisdiction over 
complaints about the Australian Federal Police under the Complaints (Australian Federal 
Police) Act 1981 (Cth) and the ACT Ombudsman under the Ombudsman Act 1989 
(ACT).  On the other hand missing from the original “Completed Projects List” and also 
not included in this study are the reports originating from the auditing role of the Office.  
For example, these include the compliance reports the Office completes annually to 
monitor the compliance of the ACC and the AFP with controlled operations. 
 
A further value in using the original “Completed Projects List” is that it refers to reports 
completed by the Office that are not made available to the public.
96
 This allows for 
analysis of any trends in the extent of the public reporting transparency of systemic 
investigations by the Office.  As the Office website states, “[T]he Ombudsman is subject 
to statutory secrecy provisions, and for reasons of privacy, confidentiality or privilege it 
may be inappropriate to publish all or part of a report.”97 The wider study will evaluate in 
the frequency with which such privacy provisions are utilized.   
 
Each item listed on the “Completed Projects List” broadly corresponds to individual files 
kept in the Canberra Office and/or located on the Office website.  Each of the reports 
referred to in this “Completed Projects List” is therefore capable of being read in its 
entirety as it relates to an actual full (or partial) written project, formal report and/or 
submission stored by the Office.  It is this larger written report which is read, coded and 
analysed by this study.  This is further discussed below in Part B.  
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The data in this study is therefore compiled from a list of reports self-identified by the 
Office.  While this provides the advantage of a controlled and identifiable number of 
reports it has the disadvantage that the completeness of the “Completed Projects List” is 
open to question. This is where data triangulation has been used. Through data 
triangulation, in particular the Annual Reports of the Office, two shortcomings of the 
original “Completed Projects List” are apparent.  Firstly, a “small” number of reports are 
not included in the list and have been located and obtained either from the material at the 
Office or upon the Office web site.
98
    Secondly, a small number of inconsistencies exist 
between the “Completed Projects List” and the material documented in Annual Reports.  
These shortcomings have been rectified as far as possible through the compilation of the 
final “Master List” by for example identifying any material lacking from the Master List 
(such as section 16 reports under the Ombudsman Act 1976).  
 
For transparency this study contains extracts of both the Completed Projects List and a 
completed Master List.  The Master List used for the purposes of this study both amends 
and updates the Completed Projects List to ensure the accuracy of this study.  The Master 
List utilizes the essence of the Completed Projects List, corrects its errors and includes 
and excludes information based upon the three systemic functions examined by this 
study.  
 
The use of this Master List is essential.  It renders the evidence identifiable and subject to 
collation by allowing coverage of the first 28 years of formal reports, submissions and 
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own motions (with an end point of June 2005)
99
 of the Office.  This longitudinal 
timeframe of information is critical in allowing analysis of the statistics to reveal 
contrasts between reporting styles, approaches and the shifting focus of systemic issues 
over periods of the Office.   
 
 
B Assumption Two – identification of variables 
 
Relevant data is extracted from each report identified in the Master List.  In order to 
create a data set capable of meaningful analysis the following dependent variables are 




(a) number of cases in which administrator accepts ombudsman’s 
recommendation either immediately or in principle; 
 
(b) number of cases where administrator rejects ombudsman’s recommendations; 
 
(c) number of cases where recommendations made (and accepted or rejected by 
administrator) are policy as opposed to procedure as opposed to legislative; 
 
(d) how the investigation was initiated; 
 
(e) which agency investigated; 
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(f) duration of investigation; 
 
(g) length of report; 
 
(h) support of agency in investigation; 
 
(i) section of legislation used to carry out investigation;        
 
(j) date released and the individual Ombudsman;   
 
(k) media release and publicity; 
 
(l) ongoing monitoring; and 
 
(m) an overall rating in terms of impact.  
 
Measurement in each category counts frequencies.  The relevance of each measure and 




(a) and (b) number of cases in which administrator accepts ombudsman’s 
recommendation either immediately or in principle or where administrator rejects 
recommendation; 
 
The most basic questions to ask in terms of impact is whether the systemic 
recommendations of the Office are taken notice of and to what degree?  This is a question 
present in the methodologies of both Danet and Hill. Danet notes that this measure can be 
used as a general measure of responsiveness and also be analyzed by department or 
agency to diagnose where the “most critical problems lie”.101   This measure will, in the 
context of the Office, provide overview as to systemic impact upon government 
departments and agencies.  So, where most of the recommendations of the Office are 
rejected and few steps taken to progress or alter that decision, an inference may be made 
that the systemic impact of the office is negligible.  Conversely where there is a high 
acceptance rate it may be inferred that the impact is high.   
 
Danet’s study phrased this as the concept of asking when the ombudsman finds a 
complaint justified and makes a recommendation how does the system respond? This 
aspect of Danet’s study is applied to systemic investigations through examining the 
quantity of recommendations of the Office and in particular, when those 
recommendations are rejected by departments leading to the usage of the ultimate power 
of the Office to report to Parliament and the Prime Minister.  
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These measures fail to take into account quality of impact and also do not measure 
whether an agency has actually implemented the recommendations it claims to have.  
Both measures predominately rely upon statements as to the acceptance of 
recommendations made in the formal reports and own motion investigations and 
submissions.
102
  This information has not been consistently recorded.  Some Annual 
Reports and formal reports note recommendations made and rejected while most do not.  
The most recent reports seem to have a better strike rate on this point.   
 
In a small number of the 231 investigatory reports it is however difficult to distill both 
outcomes of the recommendations and sometimes even the actual recommendations 
themselves.  This is also due to the process of issuing reports.  Draft reports are issued to 
departments prior to recommendations being finalized.  This means that many of the 
recommendations may have already been implemented prior to the final version of the 
report being issued.  It is at times impossible to know exactly what recommendations 
were made or adopted from draft reports.  This point is discussed in (m) below. 
 
( c) number of cases where recommendations made (and accepted or rejected by 
administrator) are policy as opposed to procedure as opposed to legislative; 
 
This variable provides a measure as to how the Office uses its recommendations by 
identifying differences between the type of recommendation made.  This study uses two 
categories: policy and legislative change being one and procedural change being the 
other. As noted previously this reflects distinctions drawn by previous empirical studies 
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such as that by Aufrecht & Brelsford where legislative change is viewed by as 
“potentially the most useful objective measure of long-term systemic impact.”103 This 
study therefore classifies each recommendation in every report as either “thick and 
direct” (policy and legislative change) or “thin and direct” (procedural only) as explained 
in (m) below.   
 
It is difficult to discern the take-up of recommendations by administrators. Indeed this 
measure highlights the different standards of record-keeping between the dual roles of the 
Office where details are kept as to numbers of individual complaints, whom the 
complaints were against, how they are resolved –  whereas this is not done with systemic 
investigations.  The Office has not undertaken a continuing efficiency audit with respect 
to agencies accepting or rejecting its recommendations.  This aspect of take-up was 
therefore not measured by this study.  
 
(d) by whom and how investigations are initiated  
 
This measure examines why and how the discretion to undertake own motion 
investigations, formal reports or submissions is triggered.  Aufrecht and Brelsford note 
this will also assist in identifying how individual Ombudsman see their own office – 
whether it is an office for solving the complaints of citizens or improving the system. 
Aufrecht and Brelsford state that “[W]hile we suspect the overwhelming majority will be 




This measure identifies six categories of complaint origin which may trigger systemic 
investigations: 
 
Individual meaning one or two complaints. 
 
Series where individual complaints are collated over time or a large number of individual 
complaints received or mentions in Annual Reports of numerous complaints over a 
period of time. 
 
Referral to the Office from an agency. 
 
Organisational to the Office from company/accountant/solicitor/minister/media.  
 
Submission by the Office to law reform body or similar. 
 
Ongoing monitoring where the Ombudsman reviews whether recommendations 
implemented. 
 
In order to ensure accuracy this information had to be triangulated with cross checking 
against the relevant Annual Report or subsequent year.  
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The breakdown into the above six categories is critical for analysis.  For example, if a 
large number of systemic investigations are concerned with the ongoing monitoring of 
agency conduct by the Office this may lead to discussion as to whether its role is 
becoming more proactive rather than reactive.   
 
This measure also allows testing of assertions made in leading academic commentary.  
For example Professor Dennis Pearce suggests that most Ombudsman are anxious to 
pursue the issue of a pattern of repeated individual complaints and that in such cases 
“Ombudsmen’s recommendations for changes of this kind are seldom rejected by the 
agencies concerned.” 105  A further assertion by Walter Gellhorn, a leading international 
commentator, is that this power will be used “chiefly to enquire into problems of general 
public concern as distinct from individually focused conflict”.106   This variable provides 
factual analysis of these observations.  
 
(e) which agency investigated 
 
Again a basic question is what is the problem – who is it about?  Danet termed this 
measure the “Target of the Complaint”.  Every Annual Report contains information about 
which department/agency was complained against in terms of individual complaints.  
Similarly, systemic investigations target department(s)agency(s).  This study neutralizes 
the impact of changes in departmental names and portfolios by assessing the major areas 
of complaint and allocating specific departments to those areas (explained above).   
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This information therefore identifies the department/agency investigated with the aim of 
exploring the systemic focus of the Office and how that correlates with individual 
complainants.  Further, the Office may investigate more than one agency at a time.  The 
number of investigations where the Office targets all government departments may be 
viewed as having a wider impact than those that specifically focus upon individual 
agencies. In some investigations the Office may not target all departments but its 
investigations impacts upon more than one agency. Where that occurs in the Master List 
the report is placed into the Portfolio which is specific rather than “other”.  There are 
seven such reports:  
 
1981/1982 - Immigration & Other (allocated to Immigration) 
 
1982/1983 - AFP & Other (allocated to AFP) 
 
1983/1984 - Immigration & Other (allocated to Immigration) 
 
1986/1987 – ACT Fire Brigade & AFP (allocated to AFP) 
 
1991/1992 – Defence & Other (allocated to Defence) 
 
1998/1999 - Immigration & Other (allocated to Immigration) 
 




(f) duration of investigation  
 
This is a measure attempting to identify the twin concepts of Danet’s measures of 
efficiency and resources. This is a difficult concept to draw more than generalized 
conclusions from.   At most, where own motion investigations are taking years to 
complete the level of cooperation of agencies in the investigation and the efficiency of 
the Office itself are open to question.  Such a result is generalized as of course long 
investigations may also indicate thoroughness and a heightened level of difficulty which 
indicates quality of outcome.   
 
At the very least then, an index of how long investigations take may be assessed against 
the complexity of the reports (gauged through aspects such as length and agencies 
complained about) and external factors not apparent in the reports themselves such as 
staffing levels and information contained on systemic investigations more generally in 
the Annual Reports.    
 
In the Master List the duration of investigations is measured in months.  It was not 
always possible to know duration and where this is the case unknown is recorded against 
tat category.  The duration of the investigation was often determined by examining the 
content of the report to discern start date and the signature and date of the Ombudsman at 
the end of the report taken as the close date. 
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(g) the length of report  
 
A simple index of time and resources spent on investigations is derived from the page 
length of the report.  While this measure does not take into account either report writing 
differences or methodological differences it does provide a general overview of the 
complexity and the degree of the investigation carried out.  In this sense the length of a 
report, at a superficial level, indicates the depth of investigation.  Obvious difficulties 
with this measure lie in the fact that the conclusion of some investigations amount to a 2 
page letter and others in a long formal report.  Another difficulty is the use of Appendices 
in reports  (all appendices were removed from the page count for the purposes of this 
study).  
 
(h) support of an agency 
 
This apparently simple measure, as to whether the agency cooperated with the 
investigation, is included as it reflects the true nature of the systemic impact of 
ombudsman.  As Caiden notes “[T]he Ombudsman institution is a democratic device 
conceived to operate in a spirit of democracy with a cooperative government and an 
obliging officialdom which on the whole runs efficiently and is genuinely concerned to 
rectify any wrongdoing that may inadvertently occur.”107  The notion of the Ombudsman 
operating by recommendation only and working to reform and improve administration is 
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assessed by examining whether the investigation was supported, assisted and facilitated 
by the government department or agency being investigated. 
 
There is a more subtle and subjective aspect of measurement - that of the role of the 
Office as facilitator or as adversary.
108
  As a facilitator an ombudsman works as a neutral 
third party helping the administrator and the citizen to resolve differences and improve 
processes.  The facilitator assumes that the administrator will listen to what is reasonable.  
The main weapon here is persuasion and trust.  In this sense maintaining the respect of 
administration is an important goal of the ombudsman.  On the other hand when the 
ombudsman is an adversary they are no longer neutral, the ombudsman has taken sides 
against the administrator and will do what they can to get the administration to follow 
their recommendation. In this instance the source of power is to go to a higher authority – 
the legislative body - to force change.   
 
Measuring this variable therefore allows conclusions to be drawn as to whether there is a 
link between style and effectiveness – for example does a more adversarial style result in 
greater or lesser systemic change?  This measure was one identified as important by 
Aufrecht and Brelsford
109
 who observed that the more adversarial the ombudsman then 
the greater the systemic change.  Observations to the opposite have been made by the 
Office that not much “is ever achieved by confrontation” with agencies.110 
 
In practice this measure is extremely difficult to accurately record.  Apart from either 
strident negative comments or glowing supportive comments (eg: explicit thanking of 
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agency for help) the form of participation of the agency is often not mentioned in the 
reports in the Master List.  It is therefore generally assumed by this study that the agency 
has cooperated except in four situations:  firstly where there is an identifiable section 
16/17/18 report to Parliament or the Prime Minister or where the report clearly states 
there was a lack of cooperation; secondly, when the Report states “it is a matter for 
government”; thirdly, when the agency states it has in place a process but does not 
specifically agree eg: the agency will state it is doing certain activities but these are not 
necessarily the Office suggested – this is particularly so when the ombudsman says “I 
welcome the initiatives but believe my recommendations offer additional mechanisms for 
further educing the likelihood of overpayments.” Fourthly, it is also not agreed where 
agency says it will “consider” the Office recommendation. 
 
Of course as well as the measures of “agreed” and “disagreed” there was a need to 
incorporate a third category of not relevant which applies to submissions. To read the 
Master List with respect to this variable the following codes were used: 1- yes; 2- no; 3 – 
irrelevant.   
 
A further aspect of lack of cooperation is the escalation of matters into a more formal 
report to Parliament or the Prime Minister by the Office.  This data is analysed in the 
wider study.  
 
 
(i) section of legislation used to carry out investigation  
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The Office utilizes different legislative powers to make its reports – the study examines 
how this has changed over time and what this demonstrates about criterion used.  For 
example a growing increase in Ombudsman Act 1976 s35A reports which are released in 
the public interest may allow conclusions to be drawn as to the changing role in public 
transparency and public relations of the office.  On the other hand a growth or decline in 
section 15 reports of the Ombudsman Act 1976 and s31 of the Complaints (Australian 
Federal Police) Act 1981 which require the Ombudsman to report to the head of an 
agency when the finding is of “defective administration and make recommendations as a 
result of defective administration” may allow broad generalities as to the presence of 
good administration in the system of public administration. 
 
(j) date of report and Ombudsman  
 
The date used to “cut off” reporting is the Annual Report issue date of the Office which is 
June of each year rather than Calendar years.    The date of the report and the individual 
Ombudsman responsible for the investigation (see above) is recorded.  As noted above 
assumptions had to be made and consistently applied as some formal reports begun by 
one Ombudsman may be finished by another.  This means that the individual 
Ombudsman the report is published under will be the ombudsman it is attributed to.   
 
 
(k) media release 
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This study records the use made by the Office of the media.  Apart from media usage this 
variable demonstrates the extent to which the Office is subject to statutory secrecy 
provisions and for reasons of confidentiality, privacy or privilege it may not be 
appropriate to publish all or any of a report.   For example there is a wide discretion not 
to release reports which are not in the public interest.  This aspect of the data collection 
will demonstrate the frequency with which reports are made public.  In the Master List: 
1- yes  (includes where exec summary released) but not where it states abridged version; 
2 – no. 
 
(l) ongoing monitoring 
 
This category is added due to the obvious difficulty an Ombudsman has in making 
recommendations and then completing the investigation without the ability to obtain 
feedback that acceptance of the recommendation means that they have been put into 
action by the agency concerned.  The category refers to a statement of ongoing 
monitoring of the agency by the Office.     
 
(m) overall rating in terms of impact  
 
The categories of recommendation are based upon the thick/thin distinction discussed 




1. Thick and direct recommendations  
 
This includes recommendations for either legislative and/or policy change.  Importantly 
where a single report contains both thin (procedural) and thick (legislative and policy) 
recommendations it has been included within this category.   
 
A policy recommendation is a change in plan of actions statement of aims and ideals; 
including directing the agency to develop new guidelines.  A legislative recommendation 
is where the Office recommends changes to legislation or directs agency to investigate 
changing legislation.  
 
2.  Thin and direct  
 
This contains reports where recommendations are only made for procedural change. 
Procedural recommendations are where the Office suggests change in a regular order of 
doing things; a particular course or mode of action; a mode of conducting legal 
parliamentary or other business; includes reviews. 
 
3.  No recommendations 
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This is where a report makes no recommendations at all.  This may be somewhat 
misleading where agencies have already accepted draft recommendations but is accurate 
in terms of the contents of the final report.   
 
4.  Not applicable or unknown 
 
The presence or lack of a recommendation is not applicable to submissions made by the 
Office to law reform bodies or external  inquiries.   
 
The category of unknown will apply to missing reports or reports not made public and to 
some read and analysed reports where there is an implied reference to recommendations 
or where a section 16/17/18 report has been made following a formal investigation. 
 
 
At times the above classification is subjectively done by the researcher and at other times 
the agency will itself state what it believes recommendation to be (when this is the case 
this classification is adopted).  The case study (included in the Appendix) demonstrates 
how the above categories were determined to assist in the internal and external validity 
and reliability of this study.
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As previously noted two different sets of data are used in this study. The first is the 
Master List explained above, which was created for systemic investigations and the 
second is the data set for individual complaints. While individual complaint statistics 
have been consistently recorded in Annual Reports of the ACT Ombudsman, the 
Commonwealth Ombudsman and for the AFP throughout the Office history, such 
statistics have not been uniformly recorded. This study creates a data set for individual 
complaints over the 28 year period to enable like to be compared with like. This Part 
explains the assumptions used in this data creation.  
 
 
A Assumption One – Complaints finalised 
 
The Annual Reports list a number of columns for statistical recording.  These columns 
variously include:  “complaints received” and “complaints issues received” and 
“complaints finalised”. This study uses the column of statistical totals recorded by the 
Office of “complaints finalised”.  While such matters may extend over a time period of 
more than one year, the resolution of a complaint is attributed to the year within which it 
is finalized. Using the statistical totals of “complaints finalised” has two advantages.  
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Firstly, it is generally (with the exception described below, consistent).  Secondly, it 
demonstrates matters completed by the Office.   
 
Commonwealth Ombudsman Act 1976 
For complaints recorded in this jurisdiction the application of the “complaints finalised” 
column has not been consistently applied by the Office over the 28 year period.  From 
1977 through to and including the 1994/95 Annual Reports the column consistently totals 
“complaints finalised”.  In  1995/96 and 1996/1997 the column was changed to “issues 
finalized”.  The result of this change is to increase total complaint numbers (ie: one 
finalized complaint may have many finalized complaint issues). In order to standardize 
these years the total of “Issues finalized v Complaints finalized” is averaged from 
1999/2000 through to and including 2004/2005 (as in those six reports both figures were 
available) and a 12% adjustment arrived at.  The totals in 1995/96 and 1996/97 are 
therefore reduced by 12% to arrive at a complaints finalized total. This figure of 12% is 
used to determine the portfolio of Defence complaints in 1997/1998 as well (which was 
the only year where a separate Defence category is not recorded).   
 
From 1996/97 onwards it is possible to determine “complaints finalized” through the 
body of the Annual Report rather than the final statistical tables. For example in 1997/98 
there is a complaint count for “issues finalised” in the tables at the end of the Annual 
Report however a  “complaints finalized” column is within the text, this is the total used.   
The six reports from 1999/2000 up to 2004/2005 then return to including a “complaints 
finalized” column in the statistical tables.  
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Ombudsman Act 1989 (ACT) 
The individual complaints for the ACT have been recorded in separate ACT Annual 
Reports since 1989.  These are the totals used.  Prior to that the figures are included in the 
Office Annual Report totals for the Ombudsman Act 1976. 
 
Complaints (Australian Federal Police) Act 1981 (Cth) 
The AFP complaints are tallied from 1981/82 when they are recorded in the 
Commonwealth Ombudsman Annual Reports.  Adjustment to the AFP “complaints 
finalised” column is required for the period from 1995/96 through to and including 
1999/2000 when the totals were recorded as “complaints received” rather than 
“complaints finalised”.   In order to standardize these years again a adjustment using four 
years of AFP complaints 2001/2002 through to 2004/2005 is made.  For those four years 
the columns of “complaints received as opposed to complaints finalized” is averaged and 
an adjustment of 1% arrived at.  This 1% adjustment down is then applied to 1995/96 
through to and including 1999/2000. AFP numbers include federal police in the ACT, or 
local community ACT policing.   
 
B  Assumption Two - Exclusion of outside jurisdiction complaints 
 
In order to standardize complaint numbers the numbers of “complaints finalised” 
excludes complaints recorded as being “outside jurisdiction”. This removes the number 
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of complaints recorded as being outside the jurisdiction of the Office from the overall 
total of complaints.   
 
Out of jurisdiction complaints are excluded due to inconsistent record keeping over the 
28 years under study.  A change in recording practices in 1989 renders it impossible to 
separate “out of jurisdiction” complaints from the category of  “numbers of inquiries 
made to the Office”.  This applies from 1989/90.  For this reason the inclusions of the 
“out of jurisdiction” totals in the Annual reports from the years 1977/78 through to 
1995/96 are subtracted to arrive at a total of “complaints finalized”.  The subtraction 
stops at 1996/1997 as the numbers of outside jurisdiction from that time are then 
excluded from the totals in the Annual Reports themselves.  
 
This subtraction occurs for the AFP.  It is not necessary for the ACT “out of jurisdiction” 
complaints.  These are excluded but have never been originally included in the total 
complaints by the ACT Ombudsman as they were seen “negligible”.112  
 
C  Assumption Three – Discretion used 
 
The study also tabulates total complaint numbers excluding complaints where discretion 
not to investigate is used.  This is done across the Ombudsman Act 1976 (Cth), the 
Ombudsman Act 1989 (ACT) and the Complaints (Australian Federal Police) Act 1981 







This study adopts as a measure of success of systemic impact
113
 as whether “an 
administrative improvement …foreshadowed”.114 Meaning that the making of the 
recommendation itself is counted as having systemic impact.  This definition is adopted 
as firstly, this study is quantitative.  Secondly,  it is a transparent measure and is not “out 
of step” with pre-existing studies such as Larry Hill’s of the New Zealand Ombudsman.   
 
At first glance it appears a broader criteria than earlier studies such as Hill’s, which 
defined impact as “those situations in which, as a result of the Ombudsman’s 
investigation, government departments make policy changes that have consequences 
reaching into the future beyond the particular decision complained against.” 115  In 
actuality the approach is similar, Hill used the terms impact and reform synonymously 
and classified policy impacts into substantive policy and procedural policy.
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Substantive policy being normative statements about objects as to what should be done in 
any given situation and likely to affect citizens directly.  Procedural policy being 
instrumental in character as intermediary and affecting the implementation of substantive 
policy, Hill gives the example of improving record keeping or eliminating delay.
117
  
These changes are minor and their principal immediate impact is internal to the agency.   
Hill was surprised to find that substantive reforms predominated over procedural ones.  
Of course a close analysis of the parameters of the research show that this surprise should 
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not have been quite so effusive.  It is the definitions adopted by Hill that lead to this 
result. Indeed the definition of substantive is very expansive and would presumably 
include many of the activities of the ombudsman – this was reflected in Hills findings 
that in only four years out of 12 did the number of procedural reforms exceed substantive.  
This highlights an important issue to be flagged for this study – that the choosing of 
definitions will undoubtedly influence the “success” of the Office in terms of measuring 
systemic impact.   
 
Similarly to Hill’s study, it is likely that the definition adopted of systemic investigations 
here will also result in a greater likelihood of “success” for the Office. One reason for this 
is that a quantitative approach will not immediately appear to measure either quality of 
change or the issue as to whether change has actually occurred at all.   For example, it 
may therefore be inferred that a large amount of systemic investigations by the Office 
indicates good performance as a change agent.  This inference is an adoption of Hill’s 
comments that policy changes “that are individually small may over time amount to quite 
a large body of administrative reform, and the following cumulative analysis of the New 
Zealand Ombudsman’s policy impact indicates that it has been considerable.”118  On the 
other hand a small amount of systemic investigations may reflect a lack of importance 
being placed upon that role by the Office and suggest reasons contributing to such lack of 
focus including resources; staffing and policy.   
 
Another reason for a likelihood of performance success by the Office in this study is that 
this measure is done by asking “What are the goals of the program…?”119 reflecting the 
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recent trend in the literature on evaluating ombudsman which is to ask the ombudsman 
themselves as to what they consider to be measures of their own effectiveness.
120
 The aim 
of the Office as noted in the 2005 Budget portfolio statement is “to ensure that 
administrative action by government agencies is fair and accountable”.121  If the Office is 
characterized as primarily a complaints handling instrument in public administration the 
scale as to what can be expected in terms of systemic improvements declines.  If on the 
other hand, the Office is characterized as a systemic change agent expectations move to 
the alternate end of the scale. It is important then to recognize that this study begins from 
a characterization of the office as complaint handler rather than systemic fixer.  This 
characterization is sourced in the historical formation of the Office and in its own 
characterizations through Annual Reports and its mission/values statements.
122
   
 
Any good study must be transparent about its limitations.  There are of course inherent 
difficulties in measuring the achievement of qualitative administrative justice goals such 
as “encouraging compliance with the rule of law, contributing to government 
accountability…and enhancing participatory democracy”123 as fundamentally, 
“[A]chieving administrative justice necessarily requires value judgments to be made 
about trade-offs between competing objectives, for example, speed versus accuracy of 
decision making.”124 These difficulties remain even when the systemic role of the 
Ombudsman of “improved public administrative administration” is placed within the 
more black letter concept of administrative law as the aims and objectives of 





With the above points in mind – the possible bias of measures and the difficulty of 
defining the goals to measure it against - this study tracks systemics as a scientific 
exercise and from this makes inferences as to quality of impact.  In doing so it follows 
internationally successful measures of quantitative performance of bodies such as courts 
where, for example, in the United States focus groups and statistics have been used to 
measure the performance of judges.
126
   
 
The conclusion provides one selected data results with respect to systemic investigations. 
This is the result of the methodology described in this section which designs instruments 
to aggregate the statistics and information provided by the Office in a consistent and 
usable fashion.  The reliability or consistency of the instrument refers to two main 
aspects:  consistency over time and internal consistency.  The notion of time consistency 
in this study is clear – the concept of formal reports, submissions and own motion 
investigations have remained constant through there being no major amendment to the 
legislative instruments that provide the jurisdiction for the functions of the 
Commonwealth Ombudsman or the ACT Ombudsman or the jurisdiction for the AFP. 
This seems likely to continue into the future,
127
 ensuring that this methodology has 
ongoing relevance. The alterations or perhaps more accurately, additions, to the powers 
of the Office over the 28 year period such as the establishment of additional legislative 
powers (eg: the ACT Ombudsman) do not alter the reliability of the research design.  In 
terms of internal consistency the fact that statistics recorded by the Office in its Annual 
Reports (for individual complaints) and reports available in the Office have been used 





The methodology creates twin sets of data which provide fertile ground for analysis and 
in-depth understanding of the duality of the roles of the Office.  By way of example, the 
following is the simplest analysis of the systemic data set.  It shows an overall trend of 
the Office towards an ever increasing amount of systemic investigations being completed 
between 1977-2005.
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Graph 1.1: Total systemic investigations by year 
 
 


























































































































This general trend towards an increasing focus upon systemic investigations is confirmed 
through data triangulation. As the Office does not maintain statistics in the Annual 
Reports with respect to systemic investigations this study has undertaken a statistical 
analysis of the descriptive mentions of the systemics function over the 28 years of Annual 
Reports, for as Professor John McMillan states:  
 
[T]he annual reports of the Commonwealth 
Ombudsman have been important documents in 
the history and development of the office.  
Numbering twenty-seven reports, they chart the 
history of the office, each year giving a snapshot 
of complaint investigation in the preceding year, 
while reflecting on the role and philosophy of 
the office.
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Graph 1.2 demonstrates how the descriptive mentions of administrative improvement in 
Annual Reports increase between 1977-2005.
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At its simplest level triangulation of the quantitative data sets against the qualitative data 
of the Office Annual Reports confirms the results of the quantitative data sets.  The above 
qualitative data, similarly to the quantitative data identifies a sharp increase in mentions 
of systemic matters in Annual Reports since 1990 (with spikes in increases around 1997) 
which confirms the analysis of the numerical data set in Graph 1.1.   
‘ 
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In summary it is concluded that the creation of a quantitative methodology such as the 
one described in this paper may be useful as a planning and evaluative tool for all 
ombudsman offices.  While the methodology would necessarily need to be adjusted to 
apply to an individual office or to be adjusted to suit individual outcomes the basic 
creation of data sets which are able to be subject to longitudinal comparison illustrates 
that the institution of the ombudsman can be evaluated.  While a longitudinal study which 
is quantitative in nature such as this one may not be able to provide all answers to all 
issues such as whether the above increase in systemic investigations has resulted in 
improved quality of public administration within the confines of its parameters it can be a 
useful longer term planning tool with predictive value.  
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